For the former, we need to look at the tactics. That’s not such a bad thing, seeing as I title this column “tactical analysis”. With Franck Ribery out due to injury and the General unwilling to listen to me, even though I am a genius (my mother has reassured me), Bayern went with a 4-4-2, with Ze Roberto and Van Bommel lying deep with Schweinsteiger and Sosa patrolling the wings to link up with Klose and Toni.
On the other side, Borussia Dortmund employed the exact same 4-4-2 with Tinga and Kuba protecting the back four, while Buckey and Kinge provided for a front pairing of Petric and
The tactical beauty of this game was the placement of the two deep central mids. Bayern’s two typically set about 10-15 meters off of their centerbacks of De Michelis and Lucio; whereas, BVB’s Tinga and Kuba set 15-25 meters off of their, and may I add much inferior, centerbacks Brszenka and Kovac.
This small difference was enough to give BVB domination of the game. Tinga and Kuba moved forward to engage Bayern’s attack much higher up the pitch than the opposite case. They won the ball in Bayern’s half more often where they could quickly push forward. This can be seen in the 18 chances they made. It’s less visible in the number of chances they didn’t create, but I will get to that later. They won the pivotal battle at the center of the pitch and controlled possession. And it is never a bad idea to deny possession to great teams.
All in all, BVB was a much better side on the day and, while the result may have been surpsing, it was well earned. In fact they deserved more.
So why didn’t they? It’s rather simple. Doll’s side lacked what could be termed the final ball. Don’t mistake the final ball for a final pass. I mean that
So Doll won the tactical battle and his defense stood solid for once, but it was a bad day by the forwards that cost this team the shock of the season.